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INTRODUCTION

Thomas Franklin Bowling was seventeen-years-old when he was
condemned to two life sentences, plus six years and thirty days with
the possibility of parole, for robbery, marijuana possession, two
counts of use of a firearm, and capital murder that resulted from a
botched robbery.1 Seventeen years later, at the age of thirty-four, he
became eligible for parole.2 Every year since his original parole date
of April 26, 2005, the Parole Board has “reviewed and evaluated all
available information pertaining to [Thomas’s] case and decided not
to grant [his] parole.”3 Now, over thirty years since his original
sentencing, he continues to stand before a parole board every year to
request that it review his case to consider the crimes he committed
when he was a minor.4 Every year, the Board denies his parole.5
Since Thomas’s sentencing, the Supreme Court has created
important and impactful changes to the sentencing practices for
juveniles.6 Primarily centered around the Eighth Amendment’s ban
on cruel and unusual punishment,7 the Court held that children “are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.”8
This reaffirms the understanding that life sentences have vastly
different effects on children and should rarely be employed against

*

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

J.D. Candidate, University of Baltimore School of Law, 2022; B.A., Government and
Politics, History, University of Maryland, College Park, 2015. I give my sincerest
appreciation to Professor Neal for her guidance, support, and insight. I would also
like to give a special thank you to the University of Baltimore Law Review staff for
their tireless efforts to ensure an excellent final product. Finally, I would like to thank
my friends, family, and coworkers who supported and encouraged me throughout this
entire process.
Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 194-96.
Id. The Parole Board has repeatedly cited the reason for denial as the serious nature
and circumstances leading up to the crime. Id. Specifically, at the 2012 hearing, the
Board indicated that release of Thomas “would diminish [the] seriousness of [the]
crime.” Id. at 195.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that capital punishment is
unconstitutional for minors); see Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (prohibiting
life without parole sentences for juveniles who do not commit homicide); see Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life sentences of life without
parole for juveniles); see also Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016)
(applying holding in Miller retroactively).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471.
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them,9 due to their “diminished culpability and greater prospects for
reform” and because “they are less deserving of the most severe
punishments.”10
However, this has led to conflicting responses throughout state
courts on proper and constitutional juvenile sentencing practices.11
In cases like Thomas’s, where individuals are given the opportunity
of parole but are consistently denied,12 convicted juveniles will
essentially serve a life sentence, never experiencing release in their
lifetime.13 As life without parole sentences for juveniles have been
considered cruel and unusual by the Supreme Court,14 these de facto
life sentences should be as well.15 Through continual parole denials
and lengthy sentences that outlast a juvenile’s life expectancy, many
state courts have circumvented the Supreme Court’s holdings that
juvenile sentencing to life without parole violates the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment by creating de
facto life sentences.16 There is an important need for sentencing and
parole reforms specific to juveniles.17
This comment will examine de facto life sentences for juveniles
and the need to view them in the same way as mandatory life without
parole sentencing.18 Part II examines the historical path the Supreme
Court took to implement various juvenile-specific Eighth
Amendment protections from cruel and unusual punishment.19 Part
III discusses the circuit split in applying these Supreme Court
holdings to juvenile sentences that essentially amount to life
sentences.20 Part IV discusses these sentences and what they mean

9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 479–80.
Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68) (internal quotations omitted).
See Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses,
the Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life Without
Parole for Juveniles is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149,
161 (2017).
See, e.g., infra notes 128–35 and accompanying text.
Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2019).
See Graham v. Florida, 560 United States 48, 82 (2010); see Miller, 576 U.S. at 473;
see Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736-37 (2016).
See Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 2013); see McKinley v. Butler, 809
F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2016); see also U.S. v. Grant, 887 F.3d 131, 153 (3d Cir.
2018), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 905 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2018).
See Bowling, 920 F.3d at 197-98; see Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547 (6th Cir.
2012); see United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016).
See infra Part V.
See infra Parts II–VI.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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for a juvenile.21 Finally, Part V will detail what a fair juvenile
sentence should entail in order to follow the Supreme Court’s ban on
certain sentencing procedures for juveniles that constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.22
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since 2005, the Supreme Court has taken substantial steps to
protect juveniles from punishments that it considers to be cruel and
unusual punishment.23 From the death penalty to mandatory life
sentences, the court has found that some sentencing schemes are too
harsh for juveniles because they lack the maturity and mental
development to understand the potential repercussions and severity of
their actions.24 Through its holdings, the Court has shown that it
considers juveniles to be different from adults and, as a result, they
need different sentencing considerations for crimes committed while
they were still minors.25
A. The Supreme Court’s Ban on the Juvenile Death Penalty
The Supreme Court has long found constitutional significance in
the biological differences between childhood and adulthood.26 The
Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted.”27 The Court has analyzed this Amendment as it applies to
juveniles and the impact long or extensive sentences will have on
them.28
The modern understanding of the adolescent brain by the
psychological community is that “adolescents are easily susceptible
to negative influences and act in an immature way that is, often
times, not telling of how they will behave as an adult.”29
Furthermore, there are distinct differences in the development of the

21.
22
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012).
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471-72.
Id.
See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-73.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See infra notes 29–47 and accompanying text.
Lindsey A. Phillips, United States v. Grant: Does a Term-Of-Years Sentence that
Meets a Juvenile’s Expected Life Span Violate the Eighth Amendment’s Ban on Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 42 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 185, 187 (2018).
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juvenile and adult minds, especially in the portion of the brain that
controls behavior.30
The Supreme Court has adopted this thinking and held in several
cases31 that youth is a mitigating factor that must be considered in
sentencing as it relates to capital punishment and life without
parole.32 The Court “derives [this] from the fact that the signature
qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the
impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years
can subside.”33 This created a framework to be followed by courts
during sentencing that understands the “necessity of referring to ‘the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society’ to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as
to be cruel and unusual.”34
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court first considered the
question of “decency” in sentencing.35 Christopher Simmons was a
seventeen-year-old boy with no prior convictions,36 who planned and
carried out a burglary and murder.37 The State sought the death
penalty.38
The central issue at his sentencing was Christopher’s age and
whether the fact that he was “very immature,” “very impulsive,” and
“very susceptible to being manipulated or influenced” should impact
his sentencing.39 Furthermore, there was evidence that he had an
incredibly “difficult home environment” which led him to alcohol
and drug abuse.40 Although originally sentenced to the death penalty,
the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause the death penalty is the most
severe punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special
force” and the use of the penalty “must be limited to those offenders
who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 741, 742-43 (2000); see Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by
Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1014 (2003).
See infra Part II.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473-74 (2012).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 368 (1993)).
Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).
Id. at 605.
Id. at 556-58.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 559.
Id.
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whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of
execution.’”41
The Court cited three differences between individuals under
eighteen and adults that indicate why juveniles should never be
classified as “among the worst offenders.”42 “First, as any parent
knows and as the scientific and sociological studies . . . tend to
confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young.’”43 This can lead to
“impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”44 Second,
“juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences
and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”45 Finally, “the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The
personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”46
These differences, distinctly separating them from the list of “worst
offenders,” are the bases for the Court’s belief that the Eighth
Amendment forbids the death penalty for any juvenile offenders.47
B. The Supreme Court’s Review of Juvenile Life Without Parole
Sentences
Following Roper, the Supreme Court began to review various
sentencing schemes for individuals under the age of eighteen that are
interpreted as more severe.48 These principles were applied in
Graham v. Florida, when the Court determined that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits imposing a sentence of life without parole on
juveniles who did not commit homicide.49 Terrance Graham was a
juvenile reoffender who was placed on probation when he showed
remorse and a willingness to change after a burglary, but later
reoffended with a similar crime.50 Life without parole sentences, the
Court held, share comparisons with the death penalty that make them
impossible to impose on juveniles:

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 568 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
Id. at 569-70.
Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
Id. (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367).
Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
Id. at 570.
See id. at 570, 578.
See infra notes 49, 56–57, 63–64, 68–70 and accompanying text.
See 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
Id. at 53-54.
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[L]ife without parole sentences share some characteristics
with death sentences that are shared by no other sentences.
The State does not execute the offender sentenced to life
without parole, but the sentence alters the offender's life by
a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the
most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration,
except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote
possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the
sentence.51
The severity of such sentences on a juvenile in particular—who
would end up spending much more time in prison in comparison to
an adult sentenced to the same punishment—created a problem that
the Court was compelled to correct.52 With all of the reasons
considered during sentencing, the Court held that a life without
parole sentence for a nonhomicide juvenile offender is hardly ever
proportionate or justifiable.53 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
prohibited its imposition.54 Notably, the Court also indicated that
while there does not need to be a guarantee of eventual release, there
must be a realistic opportunity for parole before the end of a life
sentence.55
In 2012, the Supreme Court reviewed the imposition of mandatory
life without parole sentences for juveniles in Miller v. Alabama.56
The Court’s focus remained on the differences between juveniles and
adults in their development.57 The impact of the holding in Graham
is that “youth matters in determining the appropriateness of a lifetime
of incarceration without the possibility of parole.”58
The Court held that mandatory imposition of life sentences without
the opportunity for parole entirely prevents a judge from taking into
consideration various important “mitigating qualities of youth,”
including home life, education, and the background leading up to the

51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70 (“A 16–year–old and a 75–year–old each sentenced to life without parole
receive the same punishment in name only.”).
See id. at 74-75.
Id. at 71–74 (holding a sentence that does not achieve “the goals of penal sanctions
that have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation” is too harsh to be imposed.) (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,
25 (2003)).
Id. at 82.
567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
See id. at 469-70.
Id. at 473.
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crime.59 Without considering the Roper factors that differentiate
juveniles from adults60 and instead imposing mandatory sentences,
the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishment” clause is
violated.61 Moving forward, all courts must take mitigating factors
related to an individual’s age during their commission of the crime in
question into consideration before the final sentencing.62
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of this holding in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, where it held that Miller should be applied
to all cases retroactively.63 The “foundation stone” for both Miller
and Montgomery, is that “certain punishments [are] disproportionate
when applied to juveniles.”64 “Protection against disproportionate
punishment is the central substantive guarantee of the Eighth
Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining a
defendant’s sentence.”65 The Montgomery Court held that all
individuals formerly given a mandatory life without parole sentence
need not be resentenced, but could be provided relief by being
considered for parole:
Extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders does not
impose an onerous burden on the States, nor does it disturb
the finality of state convictions. Those prisoners who have
shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life
sentences. The opportunity for release will be afforded to
those who demonstrate the trust of Miller’s central
intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes
are capable of change.66
As a result, individuals convicted of crimes committed when they
were juveniles “must be given the opportunity to show their crime
did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for
some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.”67
Most recently, the Supreme Court has shown that there is still
much more to be considered regarding Eighth Amendment

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 476 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
See 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
Id.
136 S. Ct. 718, 736-37 (2016).
Id. at 732 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 470 n.4).
Id. at 732–33 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010)).
Id. at 736.
Id. at 736-37.
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protections for juveniles.68 In Virginia in 2004, Lee Boyd Malvo was
convicted of capital murder after he and an adult, later to be referred
to as the “D.C. Snipers,” terrorized the D.C. Metropolitan area as
they went on a random shooting spree throughout the community.69
Malvo, only sixteen at the time, was later sentenced to two terms of
life imprisonment without parole, plus eight years imprisonment.70
On appeal, Malvo’s attorneys argued that Miller and Montgomery
prohibit all life without parole sentences for juveniles, while the State
asserted these holdings only apply to mandatory sentences.71 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that this
decision applies not only to mandatory sentences, but also in any
instance where a juvenile was given life without the possibility of
parole.72 Virginia’s Attorney General appealed to the Supreme Court
for a final determination and certiorari was granted.73 Although
certiorari was later dismissed in response to legislation passed in
Virginia allowing “all juvenile lifers who committed crimes under
the age of 18 to seek parole after serving 20 years,”74 by initially
granting certiorari, the Supreme Court signaled that there is much
more to be considered in the realm of Eighth Amendment protections
for juveniles and their sentencing.75
As these holdings are applied in state courts, Malvo reaffirms that
the application of certain Eighth Amendment protections have been
construed and applied differently throughout the country.76 In many
cases, states fixed this issue by granting an opportunity for parole.77
However, individuals who were given a sentence that includes the
opportunity for parole are repeatedly denied this chance and, as a
result, are still condemned to serve an essential life sentence.78

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.

See Malvo v, Mathena, 893 F.3d 265 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1317
(2019), and cert. dismissed, 140 S. Ct. 919 (2020).
Id. at 267-68.
Id. at 266-67.
See id. at 270.
See id. at 275.
See Malvo, 139 S. Ct. at 1317.
Malvo, 140 S. Ct. at 919; Vanessa Romo, U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Dismiss
‘D.C. Sniper’ Case Following Virginia Parole Law, NPR (Feb. 27, 2020, 6:30 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/02/27/810102327/u-s-supreme-court-agrees-to-dismiss-d-csniper-case-following-virginia-parole-la [https://perma.cc/3X2C-VL66].
See id.
See infra Part III.
See Romo, supra note 73.
See infra Part IV.
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IN APPLYING JUVENILE-SPECIFIC
EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS BEFORE
CREATING DE-FACTO LIFE SENTENCES
The Supreme Court has not explicitly stated the constitutionality of
a sentencing court’s ability to sentence a juvenile to life with
possibility of parole.79 This ambiguity has created disagreement
between the Federal Appellate Circuits on whether the sentencing
courts must also take the inherent differences of children into account
when sentencing a juvenile to a de facto life sentence.80 In some
circuits, courts apply Miller and Montgomery to lengthy prison terms
which deny defendants a “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release,”81 labeled as de facto life sentences.82 Other circuits hold
that Eight Amendment protections are triggered when the sentence is
labeled “life without parole.”83
A. Some Circuits Extend Juvenile-Specific Eighth Amendment
Protections to Essential Life Sentences
The Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits extend the ideals set forth
in Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.84 This requires every
sentencing judge to examine the specifics behind each individual
case.85 These juvenile-specific protections extend to sentences that
essentially amount to life in prison.86
For example, in Moore v. Biter, Roosevelt Moore, then sixteen
years old, was sentenced to a 254 years and four months term in
prison.87 Moore submitted evidence that supported he was capable of
change, including a psychologist report that indicated, “Moore does
not appear to be fixed in his antisocial value system as he displays a
sense of motivation to change in overcoming his delinquent

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See Bowling, 920 F.3d at 197.
See id. at 197-98 (citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012)).
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010).
See Hoesterey, supra note 11, at 169-70.
Id. at 170.
See infra notes 85–113 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 86–113 and accompanying text.
See Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 197–98 (4th Cir. 2019).
Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1186 (9th Cir. 2013). Moore was found guilty of nine
counts of forcible rape, seven counts of forcible oral copulation, two counts of
attempted second-degree robbery, two counts of second-degree robbery, forcible
sodomy, kidnapping with the specific intent to commit a felony sex offense, genital
penetration by a foreign object, and the unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, all
while using a firearm. Id.
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lifestyle,” and that he would “benefit from rehabilitation.”88 Moore
was not eligible for parole until he served half of his sentence.89 He
would not be permitted an opportunity for parole until he reached
144 years old.90
The lower court held that because Moore was serving a term-ofyears sentence, the Graham holding which banned a life without
parole sentence for juvenile non-homicide offenders did not apply.91
However, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit overturned this and held that a “sentence of 254 years is
materially indistinguishable from a life sentence without parole
because Moore will not be eligible for parole within his lifetime.”92
As a result, the court held that Moore is entitled to these protections
under Graham.93
Similarly, in McKinley v. Butler, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the sentence of Benard
McKinley, a sixteen-year old who was sentenced to two consecutive
fifty-year terms, one for murder and one for the use of a firearm
while committing the crime.94 The Illinois sentencing scheme in
place at the time did not allow for good-time credits or other early
release opportunities for individuals who have committed first-degree
murder.95 McKinley would have been imprisoned for the entire onehundred years, “unless, of course, he dies before the age of 116.”96
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1186-87.
Id. at 1187.
Id.
Id. at 1191.
Id. “Moore must live the remainder of his life in prison knowing that he is guaranteed
to die in prison regardless of his remorse, reflection, or growth.” Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1194.
Moore’s sentence guarantees that he will die in prison because the
trial judge determined at the outset that Moore could not
rehabilitate. Moore has now spent over half of his life in prison.
Still, he has no hope of reentering society. His past and future
efforts to reform are immaterial. Moore’s sentence is
irreconcilable with Graham’s mandate that a juvenile
nonhomicide offender must be provided “some meaningful
opportunity” to reenter society. Thus, Moore’s sentence is
unconstitutional under Graham.

94.
95.
96.

Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010)).
809 F.3d 908, 909 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. By comparison, his accomplice who handed him the gun and told him to shoot the
victim was only sentenced to 17.5 years. Id.
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This was a discretionary sentence imposed by the judge.97 However,
the Seventh Circuit was not satisfied with this decision.
[I]t is such a long term of years (especially given the
unavailability of early release) as to be—unless there is a
radical increase, at present unforeseeable, in longevity
within the next 100 years—a de facto life sentence, and so
the logic of Miller applies. . . But the “children are
different” passage that we quoted earlier from Miller v.
Alabama cannot logically be limited to de jure life
sentences, as distinct from sentences denominated in
number of years yet highly likely to result in imprisonment
for life. The relevance to sentencing of “children are
different” also cannot in logic depend on whether the
legislature has made the life sentence discretionary or
mandatory; even discretionary life sentences must be guided
by consideration of age-relevant factors.98
The Seventh Circuit held that these juvenile-specific considerations
must be extended to de facto life sentences and such sentences, upon
serious consideration of the individual’s age, should only be imposed
on those who are truly deserving of such a lengthy term.99 The court
vacated the judgment of the lower court and remanded for instruction
to resentence McKinley while keeping in mind Miller and the Court’s
concerns surrounding de-facto life sentences that “resulted in a 100year prison sentence for a 16-year old.”100
Finally, in United States v. Grant, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case of Corey Grant, who
was given a sentence that would make him eligible for parole at the
age of seventy-two, which was also his life expectancy.101 Grant was
convicted for conspiracy and racketeering.102 He was given a
mandatory sentence of life without parole, a concurrent forty-year
term, and a five-year consecutive term.103 After Miller, Grant
brought his case back before the District Court for resentencing in
line with the new holding that mandatory life without parole

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 911.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 913-14.
Id. at 914.
887 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 905 F.3d
285 (3d. Cir. 2018) (mem.).
102. Id. at 134.
103. Id.
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sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.104 He was ultimately
resentenced to sixty-five years without parole.105 Grant again
appealed his sentencing, arguing that this new sentencing was so
lengthy that it still violated Miller because it effectively sentenced
him to remain in prison with no opportunity for release in his
lifetime.106
The court referred to social sciences and life expectancy estimates
and determined that this sentencing will most likely imprison him for
the entirety of his life.107 The court held that it violated the Eighth
Amendment to not consider the length someone’s life may be when
sentencing a juvenile.108 Moreover, the court in Grant explained
what it means for an individual to have a “meaningful opportunity for
release.”109 Such a sentence “must provide for ‘hope’ and a chance
for ‘fulfillment outside prison walls,’ ‘reconciliation with society,’
and ‘the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and selfrecognition of human worth and potential.’”110 Clarifying that this
does not mean a “meaningful life” but a “meaningful opportunity for
release,” a juvenile offender capable of reform must be given some
opportunity to live outside of prison walls before what would
generally be considered the age of retirement.111
Regardless of how other courts prevent de facto life sentences,112
the Third Circuit is very clear: de facto life without parole is
irreconcilable with Graham’s and Miller’s mandate that sentencing
judges must provide non-incorrigible juvenile offenders with a
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.”113
B. Some Circuits Do Not Extend Juvenile-Specific Eighth
Amendment Protections to Essential Life Sentences
Conversely, other circuits do not extend juvenile-specific Eighth
Amendment protections to de facto life without parole sentences.114
In Bunch v. Smith, for instance, the United States Court of Appeals
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 135–136.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010)).
Id. at 150-51.
See supra text accompanying notes 84–100.
See Grant, 887 F.3d at 142 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).
See, e.g., Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2019).
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for the Sixth Circuit held that it would not extend the holdings of
Roper, Miller, and Graham to a de facto life sentence that is the
result of consecutive sentences.115
Chaz Bunch was sixteen years old when he was sentenced to
multiple consecutive fixed terms, totaling eighty-nine years for
robbing, kidnapping, and raping a woman.116 Although conceding
that “Bunch’s 89-year aggregate sentence may end up being the
functional equivalent of life without parole,” the court drew a line
between Bunch’s situation and the juveniles in the Supreme Court
holdings.117 The Supreme Court has not addressed consecutive,
fixed-term sentences for juveniles.118 The Sixth Circuit held the
failure to address this matter “demonstrates that the Court did not
even consider the constitutionality of such sentences, let alone clearly
establish that they can violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishments.”119
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Robert
Jefferson was sentenced to life in prison in 1977 for gang related
violent criminal activity committed at the age of sixteen.120 Under
state mandatory sentencing guidelines, the sentencing judge was
required to give him this sentence without taking into consideration
other mitigating factors behind these criminal offenses.121 After the
Miller and Montgomery holdings,122 Jefferson appealed his case and
115. 685 F.3d 546, 549, 551 (6th Cir. 2012).
116. Id. at 548. He was found guilty of three counts of complicity to commit rape, one
count of aggravated robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery,
one count of kidnaping, one count of misdemeanor menacing, all while carrying a
firearm. Id.
117. Id. at 551.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 552. The Court goes on to discuss the circuit split as follows:
This split demonstrates that Bunch’s expansive reading of
Graham is not clearly established. Perhaps the Supreme Court, or
another federal court on direct review, will decide that very
lengthy, consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. But until
the Supreme Court rules to that effect, Bunch’s sentence does not
violate clearly established federal law.
Id.
120. See United States v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016, 1017 (8th Cir. 2016). He was
convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, drug trafficking, and the firebombing
murder and drive-by shooting of a drug debtor and bystander. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); see Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.
Ct. 718 (2016).
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was instead granted a 600 month sentence.123 He argued that it is a
de facto life sentence.124
The Eighth Circuit declined to extend the Miller holding in this
case because it held Miller only applied to mandatory sentencing
guidelines.125 The court agreed that “a federal court considering
whether to impose a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile
homicide offender under the federal advisory guidelines regime must
weigh the [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] sentencing factors ‘as informed’ by
the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.”126
However, the court held the sentencing adequately addressed his
“extraordinary success” that “clearly weighed in [his] favor,” but his
record detailed crimes too serious to shorten his term.127
Most recently, in Bowling v. Director, Virginia Department of
Corrections, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reviewed the sentence of a seventeen-year-old who was
sentenced to life with parole for capital murder, robbery, marijuana
possession, and two counts of use of a firearm.128 Here, Bowling was
actually given a sentence that allowed him the opportunity for
parole.129 However, Bowling argued that although he has this
opportunity, his continued denial by the Parole Board amounts to a
de facto life sentence.130 The Fourth Circuit disagrees.131

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Jefferson, 816 F.3d at 1018.
See id.
Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1020.
Id.
Jefferson has demonstrated that he is amenable to rehabilitation.
In the time that he has been in prison, approximately sixteen and
one-half years, Jefferson has no disciplinary history. In addition,
Jefferson completed 24 courses of study, including college-level
courses such as logic, ethics and ancient philosophy. He has been
continuously employed in prison, working in food service,
sanitation and as a medical orderly. In addition, Jefferson
convenes a weekly session of Bible study. Prison staff have
commented that Jefferson serves as a positive role model for other
inmates in the Life Style Intervention Class.

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
920 F.3d 192, 194 (4th Cir. 2019).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 198-99.
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The Fourth Circuit held that although Graham and Miller require a
meaningful opportunity for release,132 Bowling’s continued
proceedings before the Board satisfy that requirement.133 The court
determined that it did not extend the Eighth Amendment juvenilespecific protections to “juvenile offender[s] who [have] and will
continue to receive parole consideration.”134 It further asserts that
regardless of Bowling’s repeated denials for the opportunity of
parole, he is receiving the form of relief received by those juveniles
remedied by Miller, which is simply parole consideration, not
release.135
The conflicting application and understanding of juvenile-specific
Eighth Amendment protections across state courts creates a large
discrepancy in juvenile sentencing across the country.136 With three
circuits extending these protections and three others not,137 juveniles
convicted in certain jurisdictions are sentenced in a manner that
ensures they will never see release for crimes committed when they
were young.138 However, the Supreme Court has continually held
that age should matter in determining an individual’s sentence and
this should be required in every sentencing hearing for a juvenile.139
This should also be considered once they come before a parole
board.140
IV. THE MEANING OF AN ESSENTIAL LIFE SENTENCE
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that mandatory life
sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment because
children are inherently different from adults, and those differences
must be taken into account for every individual juvenile.141 Courts
across the country have responded in different ways.142

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 198.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 199 (citing Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016)).
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Part II.
See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See generally Sarah Mehta, Growing Up and Growing Old in Prison, ACLU (Nov.
29, 2017, 2:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/juvenile-justice/youth-incarceration
/growing-and-growing-old-prison [https://perma.cc/KPJ3-CJ83] (discussing different
prison sentences received by juveniles throughout the country).

2020]

Rethinking Juvenile Offender Parole Hearings

237

The Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery holdings,143 while
significant steps, have not stopped many states from sentencing
children to spend the rest of their lives in prison with no real
opportunity for parole or eventual release.144 The response in certain
jurisdictions has been to eliminate mandatory life sentences that were
deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and replace it with
sentences so long that the juveniles are destined to spend the rest of
their life in prison.145 This sentencing structure creates these de facto
or essential life sentences that arise with a “juvenile homicide
offender who might be sentenced to die in prison without a
meaningful opportunity to gain early release based on demonstrated
rehabilitation.”146
Life without parole sentences, although not as severe as the death
penalty, share many similarities to it.147 In Graham, Justice Kennedy
suggested that as juveniles are more capable of change and have
lower culpability, they should not be the recipients of the most severe
punishments.148 Similarly, life with the possibility of parole
sentences, that present little to no opportunity of release, share a
comparable diminished hope of release.149
States have begun to implement minimum sentences for juveniles
convicted of serious crimes and maximums sentences that include
life with the opportunity of parole at a certain number of years.150
However, these time limits do not give hope to juveniles who know
these parole hearings will not grant them a real chance for release.151
When juveniles such as Thomas Bowling are given the opportunity
of parole, but their rehabilitation efforts since their imprisonment are
being dwarfed by the severity of the crime during their parole
considerations, this eliminates any real chance that they will ever be
released for a crime they committed when still under the age of
eighteen.152 This eliminates all hope for release that is essential for
143. See supra text accompanying notes 35–66.
144. See Mehta, supra note 142.
145. Julie Burke, Comment, De-Facto-Life and the Rare Juvenile, 37 MISS. C. L. REV. 264,
278 (2019).
146. State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 660 (Wash. 2017). The Supreme Court of Washington
held that Miller clearly applied to a juvenile sentenced to eighty-five years in prison.
See id.
147. Kallee Spooner & Michael Vaughn, Sentencing Juvenile Homicide Offenders: A 50State Survey, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 130, 137 (2017).
148. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 70–71 (2010).
149. See infra notes 151–55.
150. See Spooner & Vaughn, supra note 147, at 146–51.
151. See infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
152. Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2019).
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encouraging rehabilitation.153 For juveniles who will in the end serve
more time than any adult convicted, due to the age they began their
sentence, Justice Kennedy referred to life in prison as granting “no
chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for
reconciliation with society, no hope.”154 Repeated denials of parole
create similar scenarios to life without parole where “a young person
who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before life’s
end has little incentive to become a responsible individual.”155
Without reforming parole hearings to ensure a fair review by the
Parole Board that gives a meaningful opportunity for release, there is
less encouragement for rehabilitation, and these defendants will
essentially spend the remainder of their lives in prison.156
V. PROPER JUVENILE SENTENCING
Essential life sentences raise the same issues that are present with
mandatory life sentencing and should be treated the same.157 In
Graham, the Supreme Court stated a sentence lacking “any legitimate
penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the
offense.”158 These penological justifications include incapacitation,
rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence.159 The length of a term is
not a deterrent to a juvenile who is impulsive and immature.160 Life
sentences that repeatedly deny the opportunity for parole or parole
considerations inherently reduce any motivation for rehabilitation.161
In the case of Thomas Bowling, the Parole Board’s repeated
denials of his parole have been cited by the Board’s members as
necessary retribution due to the severity of his crime.162 However,
these continued denials over the past fifteen years indicate that there
is no consideration of his rehabilitative efforts.163 Without raising his
attempts at rehabilitation, it ignores the already established idea that
juveniles are different from adults.164 The court in Graham

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Spooner & Vaughn, supra note 147, at 137.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010).
Id.
See id. at 70–71, 74.
See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 71.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Burke, supra note 145, at 283.
See Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 195–96.
See supra Section II.A.
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“emphasized the importance of giving juvenile offenders a chance to
become rehabilitated.”165
As a result, rehabilitation and meaningful opportunities for parole
must become the norm in sentencing juveniles across the country.166
However, juveniles have less access to necessary rehabilitative
services than other adult prisoners, and without the opportunity for
parole, they may be less motivated to take advantage of ones that are
available.167
Currently, the parole system uses a risk assessment that anticipates
recidivism.168 The parole board makes determinations by reviewing
case summaries, recommendations by analysts, testimony from
victims, and in person interviews of the defendant.169 Often, the
parole board members weigh crime severity, victim impact, and the
prisoner’s offense higher than steps taken for rehabilitation.170 In
juveniles, this is not the most effective manner to consider parole
eligibility.171 In line with the Supreme Court’s holdings on juvenilespecific Eighth Amendment protections, someone’s age at the time of
offense should be recognized as an incredibly mitigating
circumstance, as well as steps taken for rehabilitation since
incarceration.172 A meaningful opportunity for parole must include a
parole hearing that considers these factors.173 This can be created
with reviews completed by the professional individuals the juveniles
work directly with while in prison and reports by psychologists of
true rehabilitation and progress.174 This progress must be given
greater weight than the original crime.175
Parole hearings must not only consider how children are different
but must also review the individual as he or she has matured into an
165. Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT
(Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without
-parole/ [https://perma.cc/42Y7-D5BA].
166. See infra notes 173–83 and accompanying text.
167. See Rovner, supra note 165.
168. Matthew Drecun, Note, Cruel and Unusual Parole, 95 TEX. L. REV. 707, 711 (2017).
169. Id. at 711–12.
170. See id. at 712.
171. See infra notes 172–79 and accompanying text.
172. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 473-76 (2012); see Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 77-79 (2010).
173. See infra notes 174–83 and accompanying text.
174. See Courtney B. LaHaie, A Model for Juvenile Parole Reform: California’s Youth
Offender Parole Hearings Challenge the Modern Parole System and Apply the
Fundamental Principles in Graham and Miller to the Release Decision-Making
Process, 11 CAL. LEGAL HIST. 475, 502–03 (2016).
175. See id. at 502.
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adult.176 While the severity of crimes can indicate evil or malice in
an individual, they can also be indicative of an immature or irrational
juvenile acting without thinking of the consequences.177 As seen in
earlier discussed cases,178 the Court has held that oftentimes these
crimes can be traced to immaturity, impressionability, and a poor
home environment, and that rehabilitation can help.179
After a certain period of time, there must be a guaranteed
opportunity for consideration by a parole board.180 This opportunity
should take into account both the age of the individual at the time of
the offense and their actions since imprisonment and entrance into
adulthood.181 Many other countries mandate a parole review after ten
to fifteen years and “[i]f adequate rehabilitation has not occurred
during these years in prison, as decided by experts, the individual
may remain in prison and his/her case be reviewed again in another
few years.”182 Some states have taken definitive action to implement
such standards.183
California is a recent leader in this effort.184 Beginning in 2013,
the California legislature passed a bill that created “Youth Offender
Parole Hearings.”185 This law requires that fifteen to twenty-five
years after imprisonment, individuals who committed offenses as
juveniles automatically come up for parole review.186 The overall
intent and goal of these massive reforms were stated as follows:
The purpose of this act is to establish a parole eligibility
mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for
crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the
opportunity to obtain release when he or she has shown that
he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity, in
accordance with . . . the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida and Miller v.
Alabama. . . . It is the intent of the Legislature to create a
process by which growth and maturity of youthful offenders

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See infra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.A.
See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559 (2005).
See infra notes 181–205.
See supra notes 172–76 and accompanying text.
Rovner, supra note 165, at 5.
See infra notes 184–89 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text.
LaHaie, supra note 174, at 502.
See Rovner, supra note 165, at 5.
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can be assessed and a meaningful opportunity for release
established.187
The primary difference between juvenile parole hearings and adult
ones is that the parole board must “give great weight to the
diminished culpability of youth . . . and any subsequent growth and
increased maturity of the prisoner.”188 Further, all evaluations must
be given by licensed psychologist who understand these
differences.189
Additionally, following the American Psychological Association’s
findings that brain development continues through late
adolescence,190 the legislature created a timeframe for guaranteed
parole eligibility.191 Even those with the harshest sentences must be
up for parole within 15 years of incarceration.192 Although juveniles
are required to show significant rehabilitation during their time prior
to the parole hearing, this law now requires the parole board to give
immense weight to the age factor.193
Granting juveniles the chance for a meaningful opportunity of
parole requires more than just a hearing.194 Following the lead of
California, a meaningful opportunity for parole will require that all
individuals up for parole undergo evaluation by a psychologist to
generate a report which is to be submitted to the parole board in
question.195 The psychologist’s report—which should include a
recommendation and account for the individual’s age and related
mitigating circumstances at the time of the offense—should be given
If a parole board disagrees with the
the most weight.196
psychologist’s recommendation, they must issue a decision detailing
reasons that include more than the original severity of the crime.197
All juveniles should be given the chance for rehabilitation and
redemption; thus, evaluations performed by psychologists—with
consideration of a juvenile’s ability to truly change—should be
understood to be the most important factor in granting parole.198 In
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

LaHaie, supra note 174, at 502.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (2018).
LaHaie, supra note 174, at 502.
See id. at 504.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 505.
See infra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(f)(1) (2020).
See supra notes 172–75, 188–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 165–79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 180–95 and accompanying text.
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Miller, the Court adopted the American Psychological Association’s
belief that “children are different.”199 Following the Association’s
determination that “only 16 percent of young adolescents who scored
in the top quintile of a juvenile psychopathy measure would
eventually be assessed as psychopathic at age 24,”200 there should be
large weight given to the assessments performed by psychologists
trained to see these alerting factors and the possibility of reform.
There must be uniform opportunities for convicted juveniles across
the country to have access to meaningful parole opportunities, no
matter which the state they are convicted in.201 The California model
is a strong standard all states should look to.202 Parole hearings
should be productive and all encompassing, rather than a show that
will hardly ever result in release.203 With the different circuits split
on how to handle the matter of de facto life sentences,204 there must
be mandated requirements across the country that dictate youth as a
major and mitigating factor, and grant all juveniles a meaningful
opportunity to show all rehabilitative efforts completed throughout
their sentence.205
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has declared that
the age of individuals when committing a crime matters and should
be considered in overall sentencing.206 However, this holding has
only eliminated mandatory sentencing that does not account for
factors of youth, mitigating circumstances, and the use of the death
penalty for juvenile offenders.207 Thus, courts now implement
equally egregious essential life sentences that place juvenile
offenders behind prison walls for just as long as they would have
been prior to Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.208 There must be a
uniform rule granting every juvenile offender the opportunity for a
parole hearing that takes into consideration the rehabilitative efforts
199. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012).
200. Hoesterey, supra note 11, at 181 (quoting Brief for Am. Psychol. Ass’n et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos.
10-9646, 10-9647) 2012 WL 174239, at *21).
201. See supra notes 147–56 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 184–95 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 157–79 and accompanying text.
204. See supra Part III.
205. See supra notes 157–65.
206. See supra Part II.
207. See supra Part II.
208. See supra Part IV.
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and psychological analysis and recommendations of every individual
standing before the board.209 Without it, the disproportionate
sentencing practices rejected in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery
will continue to thrive, only in different forms.210

209. See supra Part V.
210. See supra Section III.B; see also supra Parts IV–V.

